On 19 August, fighters from the Bizamo Command of the Wollega Fano militias ambushed an Ethiopian military convoy at Tulu Lencha, in Oromia’s East Wollega zone. The convoy was travelling from Gida Ayana to Nekemte, escorting around thirty public buses, two ambulances carrying patients, and three vehicles moving cash for commercial banks.

At least sixteen people were killed: six passengers, one patient, one midwife, three bank managers and five soldiers.

Why a bus convoy needed a military escort

The composition of that convoy describes the state of western Oromia more precisely than any casualty figure. Public buses, ambulances and bank cash transfers were moving under army protection because they cannot move without it.

When ordinary civilian movement requires a military escort, the escort itself becomes the target, and the civilians travelling with it become casualties of an attack aimed at soldiers. That is what happened at Tulu Lencha, and it is the recurring cost of security arrangements built this way.

Who the Fano are, and why they are in Oromia

Fano militias are normally associated with the Amhara region, where their stated purpose is protecting ethnic Amharas. ACLED’s East Africa senior analyst, Dr Jalale Getachew Birru, notes that they have operated in western Oromia since April 2022, following sustained violence against ethnic Amharas by the Oromo Liberation Army — the group also known as OLF-Shane.

Their activity in the western zones has grown since 2025, linked to the establishment of the Bizamo Command in Horo Guduru and East Wollega in December 2024. Across Horo Guduru, Kellem, East and West Wollega, Fano activity rose 80 per cent between 1 January and 21 August 2026 compared with the same period last year. East Wollega is the worst affected.

This is therefore not one insurgency but at least three overlapping conflicts in the same territory: the OLA against the federal government, Fano militias against the OLA and against federal forces, and both against civilians identified with the other side.

People protested

Between 19 and 21 August, four demonstrations were held — by residents of Gida Ayana and Anger Gutin, and by ethnic Oromo students at Wollega University — demanding that the government stop the Fano attacks.

Public protest in a conflict zone against armed groups is not a small act, and it rarely gets reported. It also indicates something about the demand being made: the protesters were asking the federal government to protect them, not to withdraw. That is a different position from the one usually attributed to Oromia’s population in coverage framed around the OLA insurgency.

The scale, and the silence

Oromia is Ethiopia’s most populous region. In the twelve months to February 2025, ACLED recorded 780 incidents there and 2,624 fatalities, including 738 civilian deaths in incidents specifically targeting civilians. Over half the incidents were armed clashes; two-fifths were violence against civilians.

Civilians in western Oromia have been documented as subject to arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, destruction of property, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, abduction, extortion and forced recruitment — by multiple parties, government forces included.

Ethiopia’s international coverage has been dominated by Tigray, first the war and then the unstable peace. Oromia has produced comparable numbers with a fraction of the attention. One academic study of the region published this year is titled, accurately, around the word “invisible”.

What would change it

A peace agreement with the OLA splinter faction led by Sagni Nagasa was signed in December 2024, and armed confrontations involving the OLA have been fewer since. Attacks on civilians by various groups have continued regardless — which is the standard lesson of these agreements: a deal with one faction reduces the fighting that faction was doing, and does not address the rest.

Oromo lawmakers from the governing Prosperity Party have written to the prime minister’s office demanding a comprehensive peace process for Oromia along the lines of the Tigray agreement. Among the signatories was a member whose East Wollega constituency is among the worst affected. That request has not yet produced one.

Sources

Ambush details, Fano activity figures and demonstrations from ACLED; incident and fatality data for Oromia from ACLED via the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons; lawmakers’ letter and displacement context via The New Humanitarian.