The Ebola outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has now passed 8,000 confirmed cases. As of 27 September 2026, monitoring reports put the totals at 8,116 confirmed cases and 3,924 confirmed deaths in the DRC — an increase of 343 cases and 165 deaths over the preceding reporting period.

It is the largest Bundibugyo virus outbreak ever recorded, and the second largest Ebola outbreak of any kind.

Where it is now spreading

Most cases remain in Ituri province, where the outbreak was declared on 15 May 2026: 6,182 cases including 2,848 deaths. But the growth has shifted. North Kivu now accounts for 1,541 cases and 914 deaths, and new cases there have been rising.

That shift matters more than the headline total. An outbreak contained to its province of origin is a containment problem. One establishing itself in a second, densely populated province with its own history of armed conflict is a different proposition, and North Kivu’s death figures relative to its case count suggest detection there is catching people later in the course of illness.

There is one piece of unambiguously good news. On 27 August the World Health Organization and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention declared the outbreak over in Uganda, where 20 confirmed cases and two deaths were recorded and no new case had appeared since the last patient was discharged on 16 July. Cross-border spread was stopped.

Why this one has been so hard to stop

The species is the core of the problem, and it is worth being precise because the point is frequently garbled.

“Ebola” names a group of related viruses, not one organism. The licensed vaccine and the licensed therapeutic antibodies were developed and approved against Zaire ebolavirus, the species responsible for most previous large outbreaks. This outbreak is Bundibugyo virus. Those countermeasures should not be assumed to protect against it, which means the response has had to rely on the older tools — case finding, contact tracing, isolation, safe burial and infection control — without the vaccine ring that shortened recent Zaire outbreaks.

Two further factors compound it. Early samples tested negative because the tests in use detected Zaire ebolavirus only, delaying recognition. And eastern DRC is among the least stable regions in the world to run a response in, with armed conflict in and around the affected provinces disrupting access, and health workers in the DRC having struck over pay during the outbreak.

Reading the case fatality ratio

Roughly 48 per cent of confirmed cases have died. That figure is best treated as a bound rather than a measurement.

Confirmed cases are those that reached testing. People who fell ill and recovered without presenting to a health facility are largely absent from the numerator, which pushes the apparent fatality ratio up. People who died at home without a test are absent from both figures, which pushes it in the other direction. In outbreaks where surveillance improves over time, the ratio typically moves — and earlier in this outbreak it was reported closer to 31 per cent, then 44 per cent.

What the trend does indicate is that a large share of people reaching care are reaching it too late for supportive treatment to help.

Our earlier coverage of this outbreak is collected under Health.

Sources

• UK Health Security Agency, Outbreaks Under Monitoring, week 39, published 1 October 2026
• WHO Disease Outbreak News, Bundibugyo virus disease, DRC, 2026
• WHO and Africa CDC declaration of the end of the Uganda outbreak, 27 August 2026