Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence announced on 13 August that its Multinational Maritime Defence Coalition has formally begun, with thirteen countries having fully joined and fifteen having signed a declaration. Rear Admiral Abdullah bin Salem Al-Shehri has been appointed as its commander.

The founding members are Bahrain, Bangladesh, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Türkiye and Yemen. Saudi Arabia is the leading state and will host the permanent headquarters, joint command and operational centre. The stated mission is to protect freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

How this came about

The immediate cause is a blockade. The Houthis declared a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia on 20 July, aimed at shipping the kingdom had diverted to the Red Sea after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi-flagged vessels have come under repeated attack, and the group has been reported to be planning tolls on ships passing Bab al-Mandeb.

That put Riyadh in an unusual position. With Hormuz effectively closed, the Red Sea route became the alternative for Saudi oil exports. Blockading both leaves the kingdom with no reliable seaborne export corridor at all — which is why analysts have said Saudi Arabia cannot let the blockade stand.

The Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, responded to the coalition’s formation by warning of full escalation, saying his forces would meet escalation with escalation. Traffic through Bab al-Mandeb had already fallen sharply: Reuters counted eleven vessels over one recent weekend, against more than seventy a day before 2023.

What is notable about the membership

Read the list and the interesting parts are the absences. This is a coalition of Arab, African and South Asian states — with Türkiye and Pakistan contributing meaningful naval capability alongside Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which operate the largest navies among the Red Sea states. Most of the smaller members have coastal patrol forces rather than blue-water fleets.

The United States is not a member. Neither is any European state, nor Israel. That is a marked change from the coalitions assembled in 2023 and 2024, which were Western-led and which Saudi Arabia declined to join.

The United Arab Emirates is also absent, having lost access to several military facilities on Yemeni islands near Bab al-Mandeb and in northern Somalia. Yemen’s internationally recognised government is a signatory — meaning the coalition includes one Yemeni authority against another.

Will it work?

The honest answer is that nothing tried so far has. Two Western naval operations are already in these waters — the US-led Combined Task Force 153 and the European Union’s Operation Aspides, running since February 2024 — and Houthi attacks have continued through both. It is not yet clear how the new coalition will coordinate with either.

Ahmed Nagi, the International Crisis Group’s senior Yemen analyst, told Al Jazeera the alliance could prove significant, with the qualification that its importance depends on what it actually does rather than what it announces.

There is a structural problem beneath the naval one. Escorting ships defends against attacks; it does not stop them being launched. The Houthis fire from land, and the capability is supplied and sustained regardless of how many frigates patrol the corridor. A coalition that intends to change the situation rather than manage it would have to act ashore — which is a war, not a convoy operation, and one Saudi Arabia spent eight years fighting without resolution.

What is different this time is the motive. Previous coalitions were protecting global trade in general. This one is protecting the exports of the state that leads it, which tends to concentrate the mind.

Sources

Saudi Ministry of Defence announcements; Al Jazeera; Euronews; The National; The Hill; Reuters shipping data.